

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 IO-13 ADP-00 EURE-00 CCO-00 SSO-00

NSCE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 CIAE-00 PM-09 H-02 INR-09

L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-14 GAC-01

SAL-01 MBFR-03 SAJ-01 OIC-04 T-03 AEC-11 AECE-00

OMB-01 RSR-01 /127 W

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O P 091334 Z MAR 73

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3766

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY OSLO

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK

AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

USMISSION GENEVA

USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE

USNMR SHAPE

USDEL SALT TWO

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 BONN 3546

VIENNA FOR MBFR DEL; HELSINKI FOR MPT DEL;
SHAPE FOR POLAD

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, GW, NATO, PFOR

SUBJ: MBFR PARTICIPATION AND THE " ALL 19" APPROACH

BEGIN SUMMARY: FRG HAS CONCLUDED IT WAS TACTICAL MISTAKE FOR WEST TO TRY TO TREAT STATUS AS PROCEDURAL MATTER. IF SOVIETS GIVE EXPECTED NEGATIVE REPLY TO " ABEYANCE PLUS" FORMULA, FRG WILL STRONGLY PUSH " ALL-19" FALLBACK APPROACH FOR EXPLORATIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS. PER GERMAN CONCEPT STATUS ONLY WOULD BE DEFINED BY OBLIGATIONS INCURRED IN EVENTUAL MBFR AGREEMENT OR AGREEMENTS; LINK BETWEEN STATUS AND PROCEDURAL CHARACTER OF PARTICIPATION AT MIT OR MBFR NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE SEVERED. BONN (AND LONDON) STRONGLY OPPOSED TO FLANK STATUS FOR HUNGARY; GERMANS ATTRIBUTE MODEST WEIGHT TO NON- PAPER ANNEXES AND DISLIKE OF " NON- CIRCUMVENTION" AND " NON- REDICTION MEASURES". GERMANS ALSO LIKE IDEA OF INITIAL INFORMAL PLENARY TO ENGAGE TALKS BY " AGREEING TO DISAGREE", BUT FEARS USSR MAY DECLINE, AND ARE APPALLED BY NOTION OF " PLENARY COCKTAILS". END SUMMARY.

1. DURING MARCH 9 CONVERSATIONS WITH EMBOFF, FRG DISARMAMENT COMMISSIONER ROTH SAID HE HAD JUST DISPATCHED A MEMO TO ACTING FONMIN FRANK AND CHANCELLOR BRANDT, CONCLUDING THAT THE ALLIES HAD ERRED IN SEEKING TO TREAT THE MBFR STATUS QUESTION AS A PROCEDURAL MATTER, SINCE STATUS IS SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE THAT WOULD BE SUBJECT TO NEGOTIATION THROUGHOUT MBFR ENTERPRISE. THE FRG HAD RELUCTANTLY AGREED TO GO ALONG WITH THE US PROPOSED " ABEYANCE PLUS" FORMULA. BUT THE GERMANS ALSO SHARED THE US VIEW THAT THIS APPROACH IS LIKELY TO BE REJECTED
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BY THE USSR. ROTH SAID THE GOAL NOW IS TO START

MIT EXPEDITIOUSLY, TO NAIL DOWN STARTING DATE FOR AUTUMN NEGOTIATIONS AND TO ELABORATE AGENDA OR WORK PROGRAM, WHICH IN ANY CASE IS LIKELY TO BE MORE MODEST AND CAST IN BROADER TERMS THAN ALLIES HAD EARLIER ANTICIPATED (SEE SEPTTEL).

2. IN CONSIDERING FURTHER FALLBACKS TO ATTAIN THESE OBJECTIVES ROTH SAID THE GERMANS (AND BRITISH) ARE STRONGLY OPPOSED TO THE US READINESS TO ACCORD FLANK STATUS TO HUNGARY; WHILE THE ANNEXES OF THE SPC NON- PAPER (PARAS C AND D OF SYG DRAFT-- USNATO 1195) ARE OF SOME UTILITY, ROTH SAID THEY ARE NOT SUFFICIENT TO PERMIT BONN TO GO ALONG WITH THAT SECOND US FALLBACK. SUCH A RESULT WOULD IN THE GERMAN VIEW PREJUDICE THE WESTERN POSITION ON THIS IMPORTANT SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE.

3. IN ROTH' S VIEW, IT WOULD BE A SERIOUS MISTAKE FOR THE ALLIANCE TO ACCEPT THIS STRATEGIC SOVIET FORMULATION ON MBFR, WHICH MIGHT ALSO PROVIDE A BASIS FOR SUBSEQUENT WP PROPOSALS RE THE BALKANS, SUCH AS A NUCLEAR FREE ZONE. ROTH RECALLED THAT THE US HAD NOT ACCEPTED THE STRATEGIC SOVIET CONCEPT REGARDING CENTRAL SYSTEMS IN SALT, AND ARGUED THIS SHOULD NOT BE DONE IN THE MBFR ENTERPRISE EITHER. IT WAS BETTER TO FIND A WAY TO SET THE STRATEGIC QUESTION ASIDE.

4. ROTH SAID THE GERMANS SEE SOME MERIT IN THE BRITISH IDEA OF AN INITIAL INFORMAL PLENARY MEETING IN AN EFFORT TO GET THE SOVIETS TO AGREE TO DISAGREE OVER THE STATUS ISSUE AND THEN GO ON TO DISCUSSION OF AN MBFR WORK PROGRAM AND OTHER MIT TOPICS. BUT ROTH SAID HE HAS THE IMPRESSION THAT THE SOVIET POSITION HAS HARDENED AND THAT RUSSIA NOW IS LIKELY TO SEEK STRATEGICALLY TO EQUATE HUNGARY WITH ITALY; THE RUSSIANS THEREFORE MIGHT, IN REPLY TO AN " AGREEMENT TO DISAGREE" APPROACH, INSIST THAT THE STATUS OF ITALY ALSO BE LEFT UNDECIDED. BUT ROTH SAID THE GERMANS PREPARED TO SUPPORT THIS APPROACH IF THE US WOULD AGREE TO GO TO BAT WITH THE SOVIETS IN URGING IT.

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5. IN ROTH' S VIEW, THE BEST WAY TO OPEN MIT PLENARIES IS STILL THE " ALL-19" APPROACH. ROTH ASKED EMBOFF TO EXPLAIN WHY THE US OBJECTED TO THIS POSITION. IN REPLY, EMBOFF NOTED THAT THIS

WOULD LEAVE OPEN THE ENTIRE ISSUE OF MBFR STATUS,
INCLUDING THAT OF BENELUX AND THE ALLIED FLANK
COUNTRIES, AS WELL AS RUMANIA AND BULGARIA. THIS
SCENARIO ALSO MIGHT OPEN A WEDGE FOR PARTICIPATION BY NEUTRALS.
EMBOFF CONTINUED THAT THE FLANK ALLIES APPEARED TO BE FIRMLY
AGAINST THE " ALL-19" APPROACH AND THAT AN EFFORT TO
SHIFT THE POSITION OF FLANK ALLIES DOUBTLESS WOULD
CAUSE FRACTIOUS, TIME- CONSUMING DEBATE IN THE
ALLIANCE AND PROBABLY WOULD BE UNSUCCESSFUL. EMBOFF
ASKED ROTH IF HE HAD ANY INDICATION THAT THE ITALIANS
OR OTHER FLANK ALLIES WERE PREPARED TO SHIFT THEIR
NEGATIVE POSITIONS ON " ALL-19" APPROACH.
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INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 IO-13 EURE-00 ADP-00 CCO-00 SSO-00

NSCE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 CIAE-00 PM-09 H-02 INR-09

L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-14 GAC-01

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FM AMEMBASSY BONN
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6. ROTH RESPONDED THAT HE THOUGHT DELIBERATIVE STATUS OF BENELUX COUNTRIES WAS AS FIXED AS WAS POSSIBLE FOR THE PRESENT TIME AND THAT NO COMMITMENT BY BENELUX COUNTRIES COULD BE UNBREAKABLE IF IT APPEARED LATER TO VITAL CONFLICT WITH NATIONAL INTERESTS. AS FOR THE NEUTRALS, ROTH SAID THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE AGREEMENT THAT PARTICIPATION IN EXPLORATIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE LIMITED TO THE 19 PRESENTLY IN VIENNA. ON ITALY, ROTH ACKNOWLEDGED EMBOFF'S ARGUMENTS AND SAID HE HAD WORKED OVER THE ITALIAN EMBASSY POL COUNSELOR MARCH 6 ON THIS ISSUE, ONLY TO LEARN THEREAFTER THAT ITALY HAD OPTED FOR THE SECOND US FALLBACK ANYWAY. AS TO THE GREEKS AND TURKS, ROTH SAID HE DID NOT CONSIDER THEIR ARGUMENTATION TO BE VERY WELL REASONED, PARTICULARLY THEIR WISH TO AVOID PARTICIPATION IN CONSTRAINTS WHILE INSISTING THAT SOUTHWESTERN MILITARY DISTRICTS OF THE USSR SOMEHOW BE BROUGHT INTO A CONSTRAINTS AREA.

7. BUT ROTH SAID HE HOPED THE FRG'S NATO ALLIES WOULD RECONSIDER THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARD THE " ALL-19" POSITION IF THE " ABEYANCE PLUS" FORMULA PROVED UNSUCCESSFUL AND ONCE THE FRG PROVIDED A CLEARER VIEW OF ITS CONCEPT OF EQUAL PARTICIPATION. PER GERMAN CONCEPT, ROTH SAID HE HAD TOLD BRANDT AND FRANK THAT IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO BREAK THE CURRENT LINK BETWEEN STATUS AND THE PROCEDURAL CHARACTER OF PARTICIPATION AT MIT OR MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. SINCE THE STATUS PROBLEM WOULD PERSIST THROUGHOUT NEGOTIATIONS, THE ALLIES SHOULD, IN THE FRG VIEW, ACKNOWLEDGE THAT STATUS WILL REALLY BE DEFINED

ONLY BY THOSE OBLIGATIONS WHICH EVENTUALLY MAY
BE INCU
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